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07D renewal window (term period) calculation
1909 Act: §§23, 24
1947 Act: §§24
1976 Act: §§302-305; Transitional and Supplementary Provisions §107 (ad interim copyright);
“All terms of copyright provided by sections 302 through 304 run to the end of the calendar year in which they would otherwise expire.” (§305)
The following passage is from the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 37, §202.17:
“(e) Renewal time limits.
“(1) For works originally copyrighted between January 1, 1964, and December 31, 1977, claims to renewal copyright may be registered within the last year of the original term, which begins on December 31 of the 27th year of the copyright, and runs through December 31 of the 28th year of the copyright, or at anytime during the extended sixty-seven year second term, if the second term is renewed by operation of Public Law 102-307, 106 Stat. 264. The original copyright term for a published work is computed from the date of first publication; the term for a work originally registered in unpublished form is computed from the date of registration in the Copyright Office. To vest the renewal copyright by registration, the required renewal application, fee, and, if original term registration has not been made, the Addendum specified in paragraph (h) of this section must be received in the Copyright Office during the prescribed period before the first term of copyright expires. The Copyright Office has no discretion to extend the renewal time limits for vesting of the renewal copyright by registration.
“(2) The provisions of paragraph (e)(1) of this section are subject to the following qualification: In order to vest the renewal copyright by registration in any case where the year date in the notice on copies distributed by authority of the copyright owner is earlier than the year of first publication, claims to renewal copyright must be registered within the last year of the original copyright term, which begins on December 31 of the 27th year from the year contained in the notice, and runs through December 31 of the 28th year from the year contained in the notice.”
Circulars 15, 15a, 15t
“Under the law in effect before 1978, … The term of copyright for works published with a year date in the notice that is earlier than the actual date of publication is computed from the year date in the copyright notice… .
“The old system of computing the duration of protection was carried over into the 1976 statute with one major change: the length of the second term is increased to 67 years. … Enactment of Public Law 105-298 extended the second 47-year term an additional 20 years.” (Information Circular 15a)
“The law provides that all terms of copyright will run through the end of the calendar year in which they would otherwise expire. This affects the duration of all copyrights, including those subsisting in either their first or second term in January 1, 1978. For works eligible for renewal registration, the renewal filing period begins on December 31st of the 27th year of the copyright term and ends on December 31st of the 28th year of the copyright term.” (Information Circular 15t)
“June 26, 1992[:] Renewal registration became optional. Works copyrighted between January 1, 1964, and December 31, 1977, automatically renewed even if registration not made.” (Information Circular1a)
SEE ALSO the quotes under “Copyright Office Publications for Laymen” in the page on this web site “07A renewal failure.” It indicates that the renewal-period window opens “the 31st day of December of the calendar year in which all the works were first published” (emphasis added).
Charles Y. Turner copyrighted his painting “The Marriage of the Waters” October 30, 1905. According to the court’s decision, the copyright expired October 29, 1933. The expiration should have been the 28th anniversary of the registration, which was October 30, 1933, not the day before as the court wrote. As the exact expiration did not have a bearing on the decision (which concerned who owned the copyright and thus had the right of renewal), this difference in the date did not warrant being challenged. Nonetheless, it does point to there being uncertainties in the judiciary as to how the copyright term is to be computed.
The song “My Melancholy Baby” remained popular even as the copyright entered its second term. However, because there was an unpublished 1911 version prior to there being a published 1912 version with “1911” in the notice, two music-rights companies became embroiled in a suit over whether the song had entered the public domain after the first term of copyright. The 1911 and 1912 versions differed in, among other respects, the 1911 lyrics being by Watson whereas the 1912 lyrics were by Norton; the music was by Burnett both times.
Claimant “Bennett did not literally comply with these [statute] requirements: although his name appeared, the notice did not state directly that he copyrighted the song in 1912. His notice was of Burnett’s copyright of the 1911 version and its transfer to him in 1912. Nevertheless it is apparent that he intended to copyright the 1912 version, for that was the song he was publishing. His intent being plain to copyright the published song, the fact that the notice impliedly attributed the authorship of both music and words to Bennett is, we think, irrelevant. Also irrelevant is the mistake in date, except as it may operate to cut down the term of the copyright. Neither of these innocent errors misled the public to its prejudice, or failed to give it notice not to infringe. The purpose of a copyright notice is to prevent innocent persons who are unaware of the existence of the copyright from incurring the penalties of infringers by making use of the copyrighted work. The published notice was sufficient to inform a prospective copyist that Bennett was trying to get copyright protection for that published song to which he attached it. Had such a copyist looked up Bennett’s copyright, he would have found that it protected an ‘unpublished song’ with different words, but that ought not to have satisfied him that Norton’s words were in the public domain; on the contrary, he would then have the more reason to believe that Bennett was trying to protect the song as published, and he should be chargeable with knowledge of such facts as reasonable inquiry would have disclosed. Such an inquiry addressed to Bennett would have disclosed that he was the proprietor of both Norton’s words and Burnett’s music and intended to obtain protection for the song as published. So we think the 1912 copyright was valid provided Burnett’s music and Norton’s words were a ‘new work’”.
“There remains for consideration the question whether Burnett’s renewal of copyright on the 1912 version was valid. This depends on whether it was timely. It was made on December 2, 1939, which was after the expiration on October 31, 1939, of the term of the 1911 copyright on the unpublished song. Because Bennett’s notice of copyright on the published version gave the date of copyright as 1911 instead of 1912, the copyright on the published song cannot extend beyond December 31, 1939. If it is extended to that date the renewal was timely. If, however, it was cut down to the term of the 1911 copyright (October 31, 1939), the renewal was too late. The theory upon which a mistaken date in the notice can have any legal effect is that it may mislead the public as to the length of the monopoly. We can see no reason why the public should take one day in the year stated rather than another; in other words the public has no reason to assume that the work is in the public domain until the year has expired… . [A]nyone looking up the 1911 copyright would get notice that it did not cover the combination (words and music) of the published song. Since that was a ‘new and joint work’ Burnett’s renewal was valid.”
Writing about The Bicycle Thief (a classic Italian film), the Court stated that the “date of publication of the film was December 6, 1948… . [A]n application for a valid renewal would have had to have been filed between December 6, 1975 and December 6, 1976.” It wasn’t.
(A complete summary of this case is under derivative versions. Please note that although the U.S. copyright was not renewed, the entry of the United States into the URAA/GATT has resulted in the United States respecting the Italian copyright. Thus, two decades after the 1976 renewal failure, the film again enjoyed copyright protection in the United States.)
(EDITOR’S NOTE: The general policy of this web site is to report the decisions reached by courts in copyright cases with a minimum of additional comment, providing readers with extensive quotations from the decisions or paraphrasings of the essential points. In the case of Twin Books Corporation v. The Walt Disney Company, et al., for this site to fulfill its mission of providing readers with information that will help determine what actions are and are not permissible under copyright law, it will be necessary to provide far more editorial comment than is normally the case.)
The Appeals Court decision notes that “the young fawn named Bambi was brought to life in Austria by an Austrian citizen named Felix Salten, and was born in the wooded wilderness of Germany in 1923.” Furthermore:
"The first appearance of the German speaking Bambi in Germany in 1923 by publication contained no notice to the world that Mr. Salten intended to protect the young German fawn. Therefore, Bambi was fair game for any deer hunter in the world outside of Germany. However, in 1926, Salten must have realized this potential danger, and therefore, he republished the German language Bambi, A Life in the Woods in Germany, this time with a notice of United States copyright, in an attempt to afford Bambi some protection from the dangerous American hunters. The copyright on the Bambi story was timely registered in the United States in early 1927.
“On December 3, 1936, Salten and his publisher assigned certain rights in the Bambi book to Sidney Franklin, who then in 1937, assigned his rights in Bambi to Walt Disney (Disney). Disney made an instant star out of Bambi, first releasing the animated Bambi movie in 1942. The movie has been rereleased seven times, and Disney has very successfully marketed numerous Bambi products, including video cassettes, toys, and books based on the Bambi story.
“The author Salten died in 1945. His daughter and heir, Anna Salten Wyler, renewed the U.S. copyright on Bambi in 1954. In 1958, Anna Wyler negotiated and executed three agreements with Disney concerning her rights in Bambi. Anna Wyler died in 1977, leaving her husband Veit Wyler as her sole heir and successor to her right in the literary properties of her father, the author Salten. In 1993, Veit Wyler and his two children assigned all their rights in Bambi to the plaintiff Twin Books.
“Disagreements arose as to the rights of the parties under the 1958 Wyler-Disney agreements, and plaintiff then initiated this action. Defendant Walt Disney moved for summary judgment in the district court on three theories”, the most prominent of which was “(1) the Bambi book is in the public domain”. Of this argument, the Appeals Court ruled:
“Disney’s public domain argument in the district court was threefold. Disney first claimed that Bambi fell into the public domain in 1923, when it was published without any notice of copyright in the German language in Germany. Disney next claimed that Bambi fell into the public domain in 1926, when the German language version was republished in Germany with a United States copyright notice allegedly misstating that the original publication occurred in 1926, rather than in 1923, a claim Disney does not pursue here, and we do not reach. Finally, Disney claimed that Bambi fell into the public domain in 1951, when Anna Wyler allegedly failed to timely renew the copyright.
“The district court did not reach the arguments that Bambi fell into the public domain in 1923 or in 1926. Rather, the court found that United States copyright protection was secured and commenced in 1923, upon first publication of the German language book in Germany without any notice of copyright; that the 1954 renewal by Anna Wyler was untimely under the 1909 Copyright Act; and that Bambi fell into the public domain in 1951 because a renewal had not been timely filed. …
“In this court, [Disney and subsidiary Buena Vista] renew their arguments that Bambi fell into the public domain in 1923, and in the alternative, that Bambi fell into the public domain in 1951. We find that Bambi did not fall into the public domain in 1923. We reverse the district court’s findings that the initial copyright was secured and commenced in 1923, expired in 1951 when no renewal was filed, and therefore, that Bambi fell into the public domain in 1951. …”
The Appeals Court, in laying groundwork for why it reversed the district court verdict, states: “It is also undisputed, for purposes of this argument, that the 1923 publication in Germany satisfied whatever German requirements there were to prevent the work from falling into the public domain in Germany. Thus, Disney does not argue that the 1923 publication in Germany placed Bambi in the German public domain, but rather, that because it did not comply with the 1909 Act requirements, it fell into the public domain in the United States, and was, therefore, subject to anyone, including Disney, using it thereafter.”
The Appeals Court answers this last objection with: “As there is no contention that Bambi fell into the public domain in Germany in 1923, under Heim [the 1946 ruling Heim v. Universal Pictures Co. concerning a 1935 Hungarian song], the 1923 publication of Bambi in Germany did not put Bambi in the public domain in the United States. Therefore, we find the 1923 publication did not preclude the author from subsequently obtaining copyright protection in the United States by complying with the 1909 Copyright Act.”
The Appeals Court also rejected Disney’s claim that a copyright renewal to be valid would have had to have been filed in 1951 (the 28th anniversary of a 1923 publication) rather than 1954 (the anniversary year for the 1926 date of first publication with a copyright notice): “During 1923, 1924, and 1925, anyone could have sold the Bambi book in the United States or made some derivative movie of the Bambi book, and the author Salten would have had no recourse under the United States copyright law. Nevertheless, the district court held that Bambi’s United States copyright term was running during the 1923-1926 years, when it was totally unprotected under United States copyright law. Such a result is neither warranted under the statute’s language nor would it be fair to the owner of a subsequent United States copyright.” The pertinent part of the statute according to the Appeals Court is addressed with this statement: “In the 1909 Act, Congress offered foreign authors the same protection it offered American authors, but only upon compliance with the Act’s formalities.”
Those “formalities” were crucial in determining the date that the copyright protection began: “Disney cites no authority, nor could it, for the proposition that publication abroad without notice of copyright secures protection under the 1909 Copyright Act. To the contrary, the clear language of section 10 of the 1909 Act provides that an author ‘may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with the notice of copyright required by this title.’ There is absolutely no way to interpret that language to mean that an author may secure copyright protection for his work by publishing it without any notice of copyright.” (emphasis by underscoring in this and previous paragraph added)
Thus: “Having found that the initial copyright was not secured and did not commence until 1926 leads to the undisputable additional finding that Ms. Wyler’s failure to renew the copyright in 1951, within 28 years from 1923, did not result in Bambi falling into the United States public domain in 1951. There is no dispute that if the initial copyright did not commence until 1926, as we have determined, Ms. Wyler’s 1954 renewal was timely and in compliance with the United States copyright laws. … Therefore, we also reverse the district court’s findings that the 1954 renewal of the Bambi copyright was untimely and that Bambi fell into the public domain in 1951.”
EDITOR’S COMMENTS begin here and continue through to the end of this summary.
Readers who know of the verdicts on George Barris’s 1962 photographs of Marilyn Monroe (see George Barris v. Richard Hamilton, et al), the song “An Arizona Home” (Southern Music Pub. Co. v. Bibo-Lang, Inc.), the song “My Melancholy Baby” (Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co.), the 1950 movie D.O.A. (see more), and the Copyright Office’s policies on accepting renewals (see more), among other cases discussed on this web site, have discovered that where there is conflicting information on the year that a work was published or is dated (excluding its existence as an unpublished work), the earlier date is used for calculating the first 28-year copyright term and thus this earlier date controls the copyright renewal window. (See separate page renewal window (term period) calculation.) Thus, readers might wonder why the Appeals Court chose to calculate the first American copyright term to begin in 1926 (date of first publication in the United States) rather than 1923 (date of first publication anywhere).
Other commentators who have written about this particular court decision have pointed to the following passage from the decision to indicate that the court chose the later date as the one used because the work was written by a foreign author in a foreign language in a foreign country:
Bambi, A Life in The Woods was written by a foreign author, and was first published without a notice of copyright in a foreign language in a foreign country, and the general rule applicable to publications within this country does not necessarily apply.
The reader might wonder why this passage would limit the applicability of the American publication date (where it is later than the first publication elsewhere) to only works by a foreign author writing in a foreign language in a foreign country, rather than also applying to works written in English in a foreign country (many English-language works are published in England years ahead of American publication, if any) or by Americans abroad first publishing overseas (regardless of language), or any other combination of these factors. The Appeals Court verdict does not say. The passage quoted above this paragraph is immediately preceded and followed by matter unrelated to the points raised by critics of that passage.
The terms I underscored in the quotations earlier point to a different justification for establising 1926 as the first year of a full term of copyright: the first publication with a copyright notice took place that year, and the fact of three prior years of foreign publication is to be considered irrelevant under American law provided that there had not been any American publication during those years. Unfortunately, the manner in which the Appeals Court decision is written muddies the waters on why works in the position of Bambi should be accorded the later year for purposes of determining the start year of the first copyright term (and thus of subsequent terms). One passage from the decision quoted above contends it wouldn’t “be fair to the owner of a subsequent United States copyright” to rule that the “United States copyright term was running during the 1923-1926 years, when it was totally unprotected under United States copyright law” and “the author Salten would have had no recourse under the United States copyright law.” Readers of many of the other summaries on this web site have seen that many authors have lost out on portions of what would have been their copyright terms, owing to failures to file the appropriate paperwork in a timely manner or to otherwise secure their rights earlier. Courts have generally ruled such losses the price that copyright owners are expected to pay for their own negligence, and that the entry of works into the public domain should occur on the basis of the timetables established by the rules set forth in the copyright laws. Were it not for the wording in the 1909 Act extending (in the court’s words) “foreign authors the same protection it offered American authors, but only upon compliance with the Act’s formalities”, the Appeals Court would have likely had to subtract some years, too.
Commentators whose analyses of this case are found elsewhere have reported that the rule concerning the later year determining the copyright term applies only to copies made or sold of a foreign work in that part of the United States covered by the Ninth Circuit, or even only to copying and sales subject to 9th Circuit jurisdiction where the work in question was first published in a foreign country and written by a foreign citizen in a foreign language. This strikes me as unwarranted extrapolations. Confused by this situation? That’s understandable, and in my opinion, the wording of the court decision does not do enough to help.
Some remarks about Disney:
It has become standard argument for commentators on copyright to declare that Disney buys favorable legislation and favorable verdicts. Here in Twin Books we have Disney losing, yet most commentaries on this verdict are by commentators (the same ones who often denounce Disney for its part in lobbying for extended copyright terms) who believe that Disney should have won on the merits of the facts supporting their position.
Disney gets slammed over its side winning Eric Eldred, et al. v. Janet Reno, Attorney General, although the Supreme Court ruled that the extended copyright duration confirmed in that decision was appropriate owing to the desire of Congress to bring copyright durations into line with those of Europe after the United States entered into reciprocal-respect copyright arrangements with most of the rest of the world. Disney is also accused of buying off Congress to extend copyrights with the 1998 “Sonny Bono” act (Pub. L. No. 105-298), it being claimed Disney did so on the verge of when Mickey Mouse would have entered the public domain. In reality, the first Mickey Mouse work was copyrighted 1928 and thus would not have entered the public domain under the old rules until the last day of 2003—over five years after the legislation was passed. The commentators making this accusation are in some cases prominent lawyers, so their level of education makes it inconceivable that they were unable to perform the simple arithmetic which would have disproven the “Mickey Mouse” argument.
Disney’s film properties did not include any works with copyrights dating from before 1928 at the time of the “Sonny Bono” legislation.
“In 1956, John Marascalco and Robert A. Blackwell co-wrote the song ‘Good Golly Miss Molly’… . Venice [Music] registered the song with the Copyright Office on January 22, 1957…
“Marascalco and Blackwell’s original copyright term expired January 22, 1985, with the renewal period—the one year period prior to the copyright’s expiration during which time the copyright can be renewed—extending from January 22, 1984 to January 22, 1985. However, after the enactment of section 305, the renewal period ran from December 31, 1984 through December 31, 1985.”
(These facts were not disputed in the trial, but the fact that Blackwell died during the renewal year had an effect on ownership during the renewal period. See the write-up under renewal term: rights of next-of-kin. The decision also reached a judgment as to whether the song was a work for hire.)
To determine whether two 1946 songs (copyrighted together) had entered into a second term, the Court had to decide “whether an application for copyright renewal that is filed with the Copyright Office before the one year period immediately prior to the expiration of the original copyright renews the copyright. The Court holds, based on the record in this case, that the copyrights in dispute were not renewed and that the works are in the public domain.”
The facts: “The original copyright registration for both ‘Sunnyside of the Mountain’ and ‘Patanio, Pride of the Plain’ was filed with the Copyright Office on January 29, 1946.” The date of publication recorded on the Certificate of Registration was given as January 24, 1946. “The original copyright, thus, expired on January 24, 1974, twenty-eight years after publication. The one year period immediately prior to the expiration of the copyright, therefore, ran from January 25, 1973, to January 24, 1974. The copyright renewal application for both works was filed with the Copyright Office on January 22, 1973, three days before the one year period immediately prior to the expiration of the original copyright.” The two songs together make up Big Slim: The Lone Cowboy’s Folio.
“Plaintiffs do not dispute the fact that the copyright renewal applications for these works was filed three days before the one year period immediately prior to the expiration of the original copyright. Plaintiffs, nevertheless, contest the legal effect of this fact… .
“The Court finds that the phrase ‘within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright’ in Section 24 of the Copyright Act of 1909 means that a copyright renewal application must be filed inside the relevant one year period, and not either before the commencement of such period or after the termination of such period.
“Applying this legal conclusion to the facts presented in this case, the Court holds that the application for copyright renewal for ‘Sunnyside of the Mountain’ and ‘Patanio, Pride of the Plain’ did not renew the original copyrights because it was not filed within, or inside, the one year period immediately prior to the expiration of the original copyright. The application for renewal was filed three days too early and thus is ineffective. Accordingly, ‘Sunnyside of the Mountain’ and ‘Patanio, Pride of the Plain’ are in the public domain.
“Plaintiffs take the position that the Copyright Office approved the application for renewal and, therefore, the musical compositions at issue were validly renewed. Although the Court may consider the administrative actions of the Copyright Office, it is not bound by such actions in determining the law and applying it to the facts of a particular case.”
(The same trial determined whether four other songs were in the public domain for lack of copyright notice. See the summary under copyright notice omission.)
Barris’s photographs were first published August 14, 1962, although they would not be registered for copyright until November 21, 1986. In calculating the period when the 28-year copyright term would be eligible for renewal, the decision states, “Plaintiff’s original copyright term commenced on August 14, 1962 when the work was first published, and expired at the end of August 13, 1990. Under the 1909 Act, Plaintiff could have renewed his copyright between August 14, 1989 and August 13, 1990.” Oddly enough, he quotes the Copyright Office document “Circular 15” where it states “if a copyright originally secured before January 1, 1964, was not renewed at the proper time, copyright protection expired at the end of the 28th calendar year of the copyright, and could not be restored.” Despite his encountering the reference to the “calendar year”, he determined the date on the basis of the anniversary year. There is nothing in the opinion indicating why he would not have applied the rule of Section 305 in the 1976 Act indicating that “copyrights in their first term on January 1, 1978” (see section 304) “run to the end of the calendar year in which they would otherwise expire.” Perhaps the fact that this copyright was not recorded as of that date but came into being retroactively, made the difference. This difference of expiration dates (both of which are in 1990) does not change any aspect material to the specific verdict.
In reading the quotations under “Where to Look in the Law” (above), the term “year” should be read as “calendar year” as opposed to a period that begins on the effective date of a copyright and ends on the same day and month the following year. Other texts issued by agencies of the U.S. Government have specified that the applicable calculations must be made on the basis of a calendar year.
Some might argue that without such delineation, it is expected that a year begins with the first date of a copyright, for otherwise the term would begin with a partial year prior to the full years which are counted. However, when one considers that renewal (if it is to be valid in accordance to Title 17) has to be in the last year of the original term, and that all terms still subject to renewal (the subject of the quoted documents) run to the end of the end of the calendar year in which they expire, then it must follow that the measuring is made on the basis of calendar years.
Here’s why: if a one-year window began with the 27th occurrence of December 31st after the publication date, the one-year window would end on the 28th occurrence of a December 31st, and there would be no option to renew during the final year leading up to the 29th occurrence, which would be the final day after 28 full years of copyright term plus the remainder of the calendar year after the 28th anniversary of the start date. If the renewal eligibility period began on the 27th occurrence of December 31, then in order for the eligibility to remain open until the final day of the copyright term (the 29th occurrence of December 31), the eligibility period would be two years in length — which is not the time window specified in any version of the Copyright Act.
The Compendium of Copyright Office Practices is an internal document used by the Copyright Office to guide Office employees in their work. The 1970 edition states, in item 11.2.2:
“Computing term. The renewal year comprises the year ending on the date of expiration of the original copyright term. It includes both the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth anniversaries of the date on which the copyright began.
“I. Application before renewal year. An application received at any time before the beginning of the renewal year must be rejected, and an entirely new application must be submitted at the proper time.
“II. Application after renewal year. If an application or fee is received after the renewal year has expired, the claim must be rejected.
“a. When the office records or original certificate contain an error, omission, or patent ambiguity with respect to the date of publication or registration, which may have misled the renewal applicant, registration is possible after the twenty-eighth year as a doubtful case.
“b. When the office records state a date of publication which has not been questioned or corrected, renewal registration will not be made more than twenty-eight years after that date, even when the renewal applicant asserts that the date was erroneous.
“IV. Week-end or holiday. If the original copyright expires on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday within the District of Columbia, renewal action may be taken on the next succeeding business day.” (pgs. 11-9 and 11-10; I, II and IV are reproduced here complete)
The 1984 edition of the Compendium of Copyright Office Practices states the following:
“1303 Computing term for published works. Copyright for works published before January 1, 1978, generally began on the date of first publication. However, under the current Act the original term does not expire until the end of the last day of the 28th calendar year measured from the year of first publication.
“1303.01 Antedated notice. In cases where the year date in the copyright notice appearing on copies as first published was earlier than the actual date of publication, the original term of copyright is computed from the last day of the year given in the notice, and not the date of publication. The actual date of publication should be given in the renewal application, and the Copyright Office will add the annotation: ‘YEAR DATE IN COPYRIGHT NOTICE: 19__.’ Claims to renewal copyright received more than 28 years from the first day in the year given in the copyright notice will be refused registration. See also section 1308 below.
“1303.02 Postdated notice, If the year date in the copyright notice appearing on the copies as published was one year later than the actual date of publication, the original term is computed for renewal purposes from the year date of publication. No annotation respecting a postdated notice will be made to the renewal application. [pgs 1300-3 to 1300-4] […]
“1307 Application received before the renewal year. A renewal application received at any time before the beginning of the renewal year will not be accepted. An entirely new application must be submitted during the proper year.
“1308 Application received after the renewal year. If an application or fee is received after the renewal year has expired, the claim will be refused.
“* When the application filed too late in reasonable reliance on a record created, or original certificate issued, by the Copyright Office, or an official Copyright Office search report, which contained an error, omission, or patent ambiguity with respect to the term, the Copyright Office will register the renewal claim as a doubtful case.
“* When the Copyright Office records state a date of publication which has not been questioned or corrected, renewal registration will not be made after the 28th year from that date, even when the renewal applicant asserts that the date was erroneous. Concerning the procedure for correcting a date of publication, see Chapter 1500: CORRECTIONS AND AMPLIFICATIONS OF COPYRIGHT RECORDS: SUPPLEMENTARY REGISTRATIONS.
“1) Where the renewal applicant has relied on a certificate of original registration which lacked an annotation showing that the year date in the copyright notice was antedated, a renewal application will be accepted during the 28th year measured from the date of publication.
“2) Where the applicant has relied on incorrect information appearing in the Catalog of Copyright Entries as a result of a copyright Office error, renewal registration will be made. [1300-6 to 1300-7]”
The Copyright Registration and Renewal Information Chart and Web Site
© 2007 David P. Hayes